DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 215 936 SO 014 014

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TITLE An Approach to World Order Studies and the World System.
INSTITUTION Institute for World Order, New York, N.Y.
SPONS AGENCY World Order Models Project.
REPORT NO ISBN-0-911646-12-3; WOMP-WP-22
PUB DATE 82
NOTE 39p.
AVAILABLE FROM Institute for World Order, 777 UN Plaza, New York, NY 10017 ($2.00, 5-25 copies, $1.50).

EDRS PRICE MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS Course Content; *Curriculum Development; *Educational Needs; Educational Objectives; *Global Approach; Higher Education; *International Relations
IDENTIFIERS *World Order Studies

ABSTRACT

This paper discusses an approach to world order studies which can be used to supplant traditional international relations courses. It is one of a series of working papers commissioned by the World Order Models Project (WOMP) in its effort to stimulate research, education, dialogue, and political action aimed at contributing to a movement for a just world order. World order studies has two ambitions: to establish an enduring academic presence and to provide a basis for a movement for social change that encompasses issues of global scale. There are five major parts to the paper. The first part discusses the main assumptions of the world order approach. Part II describes the general framework of inquiry guiding world order studies. The framework involves a diagnostic/prognostic task of describing present world order conditions, a modeling task of designing preferred futures, and a prescriptive task of mapping a transition process, including concrete steps and an overall strategy. Stages of world order studies are the topic of Part III. Part IV looks at WOMP and other globalist outlooks. Five broad areas of inquiry which have currently emerged as the cutting edge of world order studies are discussed in Part V. (RM)

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An Approach to World Order Studies and the World System

RICHARD FALK/SAMUEL S. KIM

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SP 014 015

WORLD ORDER MODELS PROJECT
WORKING PAPER NUMBER 22
1982

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New York, New York, 10017, U.S.A. 1982
ISBN 0-911646-12-3

This paper is one in a series of working papers commissioned by the World Order Models Project in its effort to stimulate research, education, dialogue and political action aimed at contributing to a movement for a just world order. The WOMP paper series deals with the major global problems facing humanity today within an analytic and normative framework guided by the concepts and values of peace, economic well-being, social justice, and ecological balance. Like other work in WOMP, the series gives appropriate consideration to the necessity and feasibility of structural transformation of today's fragmented world for the resolution of these problems and the achievement of just world order results.

We invite interested individuals throughout the globe to respond to this and other papers in the series, either directly to the author or to the WOMP directors. Where appropriate, the responses and critiques will be published in *Alternatives: A Journal of World Policy.*

WORLD ORDER MODELS PROJECT

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Institute for World Order (New York, N.Y., U.S.A.)

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AN APPROACH TO WORLD ORDER STUDIES AND THE WORLD SYSTEM*

By Richard FALK† and Samuel S. KIM††

Recent macro-structural studies of the world system have been premised on a dialectical framework of challenge and response. Characteristically, the challenge presupposes the organizational vulnerability of the present system, its inability to prevent economic and ecological deterioration as well as a drift to general war. It also presupposes the system's normative incoherence, in particular the ideological and cultural fragmentation that militates against a more cooperative and humane approach to global problems. The response, then, envisions prospects for enhanced coherence and legitimacy based on the realization of shared values. It is this perception of challenge to the present system and the need for an alternative response that lies at the core of the contemporary challenge to supplant traditional international relations with one or more variants of world order studies. Although interactions among leading states remain important ingredients of a world order approach, explicating the workings of statism is no longer the primary intellectual task.

The World Order Models Project (WOMP) is part of this academic landscape. WOMP represents an ongoing attempt by a transnational group of scholars to depict the world system as beset by interrelated problems that call for value-realizing solutions. Since its first meeting in New Delhi in 1968, WOMP has held one or more meetings each year, and has produced a steady stream of publications (see references, Part I). WOMP has been identified from its conception with the Institute for World Order, an educational foundation located in New York City. Despite the insistence of some critics, WOMP has never been associated with the advocacy of world government or world federalism. In fact, its main writings have been skeptical or even op-

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*This paper was originally prepared for William R. Thompson, ed. *Multiple Perspectives on the World System* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, forthcoming).

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posed to plans for political centralism, although they have been largely preoccupied with alternative (that is, non-Machiavellian) patterns of governance on a global scale.[1] In recent years, WOMP has de-emphasized somewhat this conventional agenda of global reform, and has focused more on the ongoing dynamics of politics at the state and sub-state level. Such a recentering of inquiry reflects the judgment that value realization is an outcome of the play of social forces rather than a consequence of abstract modeling of new forms of world order. In effect, WOMP increasingly focuses upon and identifies with the struggles of the oppressed as a way to unify theory and practice in world order studies; the energies of the oppressed supply the potential, but are a far from assured agency, for realizing world order values. WOMP does not necessarily applaud the value outcomes of national revolutionary processes. In some instances, such as the Iranian Revolution, a struggle against oppression produces promising normative results at one stage, only to deteriorate in regressive directions at later stages. (See Falk, Foreword to Farhang, 1981.)

The orientation of WOMP guides our inquiry here. There is, in our view, a new approach to the study of international relations implicit in the WOMP outlook, despite its own internal pluralism. It is an approach that has grown up in reaction to the perceived shortcomings of "realism," "neo-realism," and Marxism as dominant modes of inquiry. Our effort in this essay is to depict this new, evolving approach both in relation to its contours and its developing intellectual frontiers.

A Preliminary Comment on "World Order." As is evident, the rubric "world order" is the central identifying label of this approach; yet many adherents are uncomfortable with this nomenclature for several reasons. For one thing, the stress on "order" seems misleading for an approach built around "values." The WOMP outlook, however, repudiates "order" as used in the phrase "law and order," and instead regards order as suggestive of a new arrangement embodying an altered set of social and political relations. The world order approach, in fact, realizes that various forms of "disorder" will occur, and are even provisionally beneficial, during the period of transition.

Another problem arises from the perception of "world order" as a globalizing ideology emanating from an ambitious superpower. Non-Westerners have played a leading role in WOMP, but still its United States origins and auspices have produced suspicions, at times, even among its participants (e.g., Kothari, 1980). Idealistic rhetoric provides little reassurance, as imperial actors have often tended to cloak their ambitions beneath claims of moralist intention. These concerns rightly increased when certain scholars in the West, specifically the United States, began to invoke the imagery of "lifeboat ethics" and "triage" to justify concentrating the responsibilities for

tragedies of famine and malnutrition on Third World countries. For a while, also, leading statesmen in the United States, most notably Jimmy Carter and Zbigniew Brzezinski, and even arch-realist Henry Kissinger, associated U.S. foreign policy with the pursuit of "world order." Not only was such a claim self-serving, but it confirmed the suspicion that U.S. politicians were indeed using the symbolism of world order to promote the maintenance of the present system—that is, world order as in law and order!

A humane world order approach would have to be cosmopolitan in its outlook, establishing the identity of a global citizen without devaluing participation in a particular community specifically situated in time and space. As Americans, then, it is necessary to move beyond imperial geopolitics to enhance images of a transformed world political system based upon far greater mutuality, equality, and even solidarity.

A final problem with "world order" is that it has tended to be preoccupied with imminent catastrophe. Again, such motivations as avoiding World War III or ecological collapse reflect First World priorities however much the literature purports to address the well-being of the human species as a whole. For most non-Western peoples the daily struggles for economic, political, and cultural survival and development at the national level remain paramount.[2] Their main global concerns are to neutralize hegemonic and interventionary pressures, whether via great power interference, multinational corporate penetration, or through the manipulations of international financial institutions and of Western information agencies. To be relevant, a world order approach needs to be as alert to neo-imperial perils as to the hazards of the arms race, the dynamics of population pressure, or the upsurge of international terrorism.

Despite these difficulties, we favor retention of "world order" as descriptive of our approach. The idea of world order has been considerably purged of its adverse connotations. To shift would be to run from critics and adversaries who would, in any event, attack any successor terminology as mere camouflage. Other possible nomenclatures such as "the politics of global transformation," "movement for peace and justice," "peace research," and "cosmopolitan politics" seem either obscure or cumbersome, and in some instances, have been already preempted for work of a more specialized character (e.g., peace research). Within WOMP itself some suggestions have been made to substitute "just world order" or "just world," but on balance we believe it preferable to retain "world order" as the central identifying label.

I. Points of Departure. The essential features of the world order approach can be indicated by briefly setting forth its main assumptions.

(1) *Context of Emergency/Obscenity.* The world order approach arises in a context of grave social concern for the state of the world today. This con-

cern reflects anxieties about nuclear war, ecological hazards, and about the scandal of avoidable mass misery. As such, the world order approach emphasizes the inadequacy of the traditional focus of inquiry and policy which tends to ignore these problems. The world order approach puts these issues at the center of its intellectual efforts, conceiving education as social mobilization, as well as abstract learning.

(2) *Normativity.* Closely associated with (1) is the central idea that the global situation is seriously deteriorating as a result of *avoidable evils* (Cardoso, 1977). The world order approach establishes its identity by postulating values—peace, social and economic justice, human rights, and ecological balance (Falk, 1975: 11-30)—and by thinking of politics as value-realizing activity. This provides a new type of coherence. Policy in a global setting is evaluated by reference to the human interests at stake rather than those associated only with national interests (Johansen, 1980). Normativity implies, also, a critical stance toward knowledge (for what valued or disvalued end?) rather than one based on detachment and the accumulation of skills (the sharpening of tools). The role of knowledge is to transform the context of emergency/obscenity in specified ways.

(3) *System Discontinuities.* Traditional approaches to international politics emphasize the continuities and essential resilience of the state system. In contrast, the world order approach stresses discontinuities, that is, the positive opportunities for drastic global reform as well as the dangers of statist collapse. Such a study of international politics is necessarily transformational in emphasis. The world order approach is interested in alternatives to the patterns of war and repression that currently dominate international life. It seeks images and designs of what else might be coming into being in the world that could appreciably realize world order values. As such, it is concerned with assessing trends and cumulative effects arising out of existing dynamics, as well as with the description and explanation of persistent patterns of statist behavior.

Normative futurism based on the altered frameworks of comprehensive value-realization can be contrasted with technocratic futurism that finds "fixes" (e.g., space colonies, nuclear fusion energy) to solve the problems of human society within existing economic, cultural, political, and ecological frameworks. To oversimplify somewhat, normative futurism tends toward progressive politics as it emphasizes popular movements for social change, whereas technocratic futurism seeks to persuade existing elites to invest capital creatively at the technological frontier. The world order approach is wary of, although not unalterably opposed to, technocratic futurism.

(4) *Globalist Perspective.* The world order approach presupposes that the world can be conceived of as a whole and that the human species shares

bonds and is, in fact, bonded by a shared legacy and destiny. As such, the world's statist structure is treated as transient and conditional, a fragmentation of a potential global social reality. This fragmentation arose at a given time in human history and is in the process of being superceded. The world order approach, however, acknowledges the state's creative role in preserving national autonomy and diversity in the world as now constituted, particularly its role in achieving national cohesion (internally) and safeguarding independence (against external actors). The future place of the state in some transformed world political system is a central issue that cannot be predetermined.

For most peoples, the most notable feature of recent world history has been the struggle to become a viable state. The anti-colonial movement involved the quest for formal independence, including the right to one's own flag and to participate in international arenas. More recently, the struggle has involved efforts to achieve economic, cultural, and political viability in the face of internal adversity and dissension as well as transnational penetration. Too little statism (e.g., Lebanon, post-Shah Iran), as well as too much (e.g., the Soviet Union, Argentina), pose serious value problems in the world today. Notions of self-reliance, collective self-reliance, and non-alignment represent efforts to secure the virtues of statism in the present world order system. The strengths and weaknesses of the state from a world order perspective are so intertwined at present that it is difficult to imagine eliminating the weaknesses without at the same time impairing the strengths of the state.

A globalist perspective also gives due accord to non-state actors, including those associated with intergovernmental arrangements (e.g., the United Nations, international financial institutions), transnational activities (e.g., multinational corporations, banks), and nongovernmental operations (e.g., Red Cross, Amnesty International). The world is seen as becoming more complicated and confusing, requiring that the various trends and activities be evaluated by reference to their effect on the values at stake and by their relationship to different networks and regimes.

Globalist thinking associated with the world order approach tries to avoid "globaloney," that is, preaching pieties or touting pipedreams. It does not want to discredit holistic orientations in the annals of serious reflective or activist thought by appearing irrelevant to the practical concerns of men and women worried by the context of danger and hardship. Concrete preoccupations, however, can benefit from utopian explorations. Alternative visions of the future may help facilitate transformation. In this regard, imaginative writers and artists have more to offer world order studies than the more constrained speculations of social scientists (LeGuin, 1974; Lessing, 1975, 1980).

(5) *Praxis.* The entire world order enterprise is premised on active social engagement. It is not a matter of learning for learning's sake, of fulfilling

careerist objectives, or of assisting the global managers and grand strategists. A strength of Marxism is that it moves from critique to practice with a theory that explains how to realize proximate goals. World order studies has a comparable ambition, although it presently lacks a comprehensive view of praxis. It rejects romantic politics that sets forth a wish list for the future. World order politics emphasizes the credibility of its transition imagery by which the present might become the preferred future. In this regard, knowledge is purposive, to be mobilized for "the oppressed," against "the oppressor" on behalf of human interests and world order values. This partisanship, challenging mainstream academic conventions about the "neutrality" of inquiry, is directly linked to the belief that current global problems confront us with an emergency situation. In this sense, the relevance of knowledge to action may not be nearly so evident in other historical contexts.

(6) *Structuralist Orientation.* The nature of the challenge posed by the array of "avoidable evils" (hunger, war, repression, environmental decay) is such that the structure of international society is drawn into question. In relation to war and mass poverty, for instance, the state system, with its hierarchically arranged territorial units, cannot be expected to fashion arrangements based on non-violence and resource-sharing. World order value-realization presupposes system-change, that is, frameworks of institutions, procedures, and rules that give due weight to global demands although not necessarily by way of centralization. As well, a weakening of materialist incentives and a strengthening of cooperative behavior and moral incentives seems essential for a world political system that solves concrete problems in a manner responsive to criteria of the human interest. These developments should be understood as a basic change in the structural context of world order rather than as ethical imperatives.

(7) *Transformation Prospects.* The world order approach has not always been consistent about its conception of positive global reform. Much of the earlier depictions of a better world political system were apolitical in the sense of having no idea about how to achieve transition and eventual global transformation. Implicit in this and subsequent approaches was an appeal or rational argument designed to persuade influential people. This top-down view of global reform has been recently supplanted by a bottom-up view based on the global potential of ongoing movements for social change and liberation. Hence, "the oppressed," to the extent mobilized for global reform, become "the proletariat," the social force potentially capable of promoting a progressive realization of values, including whatever structural adjustments are needed. Given the dangers of nuclear war and ecological decay and the refusals of existing leaders to take appropriate precautions, the oppression is universal and species-wide. Such a condition seems genuinely

unprecedented, and could, in time, lead to a new politics congruent with the aspirations of world order values.

It is not claimed that mobilized movements of the oppressed are consistently or self-consciously dedicated to world order values. Their horizons are generally narrower, and are characteristically focused on radical revisionings of domestic political structure. The world order approach, nonetheless, contends that these movements can have wider implications, which are just beginning to be understood. Indeed, it is becoming clearer that movements of national revolution are thwarted after they "succeed," partly because of the hostile character of the existing international political system. Other movements, such as the growing West European movement against nuclear weapons and militarism, can only succeed by spreading everywhere and by adopting wider projects of transformation. Given increasingly linked global realities, partly as a consequence of technological capacity and scale, progressive changes at the national level are vulnerable to disruptive reactions. The struggle against oppression in all its forms is increasingly likely to merge with the quest for a new world order.

(8) *The Drift of History.* Increasingly, the world order approach does not itself claim to be an independent force. Rather, to the extent it offers hope for transcending structures of oppression, this hope arises from an interpretation of the drift of history. Of course, "drift" is a subjective category; and the historical process does not pull all in one direction. Yet, the world order approach contends that certain systemic discontinuities are taking place in international life that make its description of "reality" more satisfactory than those of the Machiavellians or Marxists. Oddly enough, then, given its stress on normativity, the world order approach is a mode of descriptive analysis that seeks to interpret the cumulative weight of emergent anti-statist trends. It is this feature that deserves special emphasis: world order studies as counter-cultural journalism.

More concretely, the WOMP outlook interprets the drift of history as favoring the continuing dynamics of self-determination and national revolution. More broadly, this drift is likely to unleash a widening movement against oppression that is transnationally guided, given the agenda set by the menace of nuclear war and by environmental contamination of various kinds. It is unlikely that the 1980s will end without a major transnational ecological/nuclear disaster of some kind. If so, then the latent popular energies of those who feel victimized could easily become an explosive force in the 1990s. The first stirrings of popular protest are evident in Western Europe and the United States, and are beginning to surface in established institutions of moral concern, especially religious organizations. As one small illustration, the Catholic Archibishop of Seattle, Raymond Hunthausen,

recently urged citizens to refuse to pay 50 percent of their Federal income tax as a protest against nuclear arms which he described as "demonic weapons which threaten all life on earth." In a letter, Lutheran, United Methodist, United Presbyterian, and United Church of God leaders endorsed this proposal (NYT, July 13, 1981, p. A8).

The world order approach is not necessarily optimistic about the future. It does anticipate pervasive turmoil that will alter decisively the political frameworks for problem-solving in the decades ahead, but quite possibly in a regressive manner. Those modes of inquiry that presuppose the persisting solidity of existing frameworks, therefore, will not help us understand what is really happening in the world (e.g. Bull, 1977; Hoffman, 1978, 1981).

II. The General Framework of Inquiry. The preceding discussion suggests that the general framework of inquiry guiding world order studies is designed to perform several tasks of normative social research. Based on the methodological assumption that the transformation of global actors, values and institutions needed for a preferred world order system is both necessary and possible, this approach involves (1) a *diagnostic/prognostic* task of describing present world order conditions and trends, (2) a *modelling* task of designing preferred futures, and (3) a *prescriptive* task of mapping a transition process, including concrete steps and an overall strategy.

(1) *Systemic Trends and Capabilities.* At the heart of this particular diagnostic and prognostic task lies the following inquiry: What is the "social health" or "social pathology" of the world system today? This is a matter of describing empirical reality (the world that is) in terms of the degree to which world order values are distributed, realized, suppressed. There are several related tasks: first, that of clarifying emerging realities in relation to positive and negative trends bearing on prospects for world order values; and secondly, that of extrapolating from existing trends the possible world or worlds of the future. The scope of such an undertaking extends beyond consideration of interstate relations and inter-elite conflict. The world order approach emphasizes the complex interplay between forces of destruction and creativity that are being set loose in the world political system under current conditions. Out of this interplay, one can begin to grasp reasons for despair and hope in the present period.

The world crisis has been intensified in the early 1980s by a new cycle of geopolitical rivalries and arms competitions in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the revival of U.S. interventionary activism. The conclusion to be drawn from straightforward extrapolation is, observes Johan Galtung (1980: 18) in a recent world order study, that humankind is in increasing trouble. At the same time, world order studies has become increasingly cognizant of the danger of losing credibility (and audience) by habitually crying

"wolf" through the assignment of specific doomsday dates (e.g., unless fundamental change occurs, all will be lost by the year 2000 or at the end of the next decade). As will be seen later in the evolution of WOMP thinking, more and more world order projects seek out the latent potentialities and hidden trends that run counter to the visible deterioration of the present human condition. World order studies is a protracted movement in which there is an ongoing dialectic between long-term normative visions of preferred worlds and short-term political imperatives of the transition process.

Traditional utopian thinking was marred by a pervasive mixture of empirical and preferred realities. "World order realism" seeks to avoid sentimental exercises in wishful thinking, while at the same time rejecting the dominant perceptual pardigm of the "realist" school. The search for a credible conception of system transformation distinguishes contemporary world order thinking from traditional world order thinking. We reject the "realist" image of world order as reductionistic and anachronistic. Based on their rigid and overly pessimistic conception of human nature, the realists tend to view the present as a continuation of the past. Seeing the worst in human nature and translating such a one-dimensional view of human history into social policy, the realists lend a sense of inevitability and legitimacy to a Hobbesian world of interstate rivalry where the best that can be hoped is that prudence will encourage restraint and that muddling along will not encounter serious breakdowns of the system.

(2) *Images of Possible and Preferred Futures.* As a social and intellectual movement aimed at catalyzing thought and action for helping shape the future of human destiny in a more just and humane direction, world order studies is a species of future studies. The conceptual premise of world order modelling lies in the sociopsychological principle that may be reformulated as follows: what we feel, believe, think, expect or wish shapes not only our present behavior but also the kinds of futures we transmit and posterity inherits. This principle has found various formulations in social science research. Anatol Rapoport (1964: 30) noted that "probabilities which we assign to events become reflections of our preferences rather than of our knowledge." In a similar vein, Kenneth Boulding (1956: 6, 11) has written that our behavior depends on the image, which he defines as "the subjective knowledge structure" of any individual or organization consisting "not only of images of 'fact' but also images of 'value'."

The image often defines first and only then do we see "social reality." For centuries, slavery was "imagined" as an immutable part of the natural social order. It was thus "utopian" to advocate its abolition. The image holds a powerful grip on how we define the outer limits and possibilities of social change. The future can never be foreclosed; it is largely a product of political

will. Everything we do or fail to do affects the shaping of our individual and collective future. Whether we realize it or not tomorrow is always present in the images of today that are operative at all levels of social reality, from the individual to the state. The sense of the future is an aspect of the "is" (the empirical reality) because we have expectations that certain things or events are to recur in a certain way and conform our behavior accordingly.

World order modelling presumes the plausibility of system change and as such differs from most futures research. Mainstream futures research largely rests on the assumption of system-continuity, which is expressed in the extrapolation of possible alternative futures from past and present. This was, for example, the dominant assumption for *The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation*, in which the authors observe that the "capacities for and commitment to economic development and control over our external and internal environment are increasingly seeming without foreseeable limit" (Kahn and Wiener, 1967: 116). Even *The Global 2000 Report*, the most ambitious and comprehensive projections developed by U.S. Government agencies of what will happen to population, resources, and environment, is based on presumed system continuity, as well as the maintenance of "present policies." Projections based on such an outlook disclose more or less similar trends: "continued economic growth in most areas, continued population growth everywhere, reduced energy growth, an increasingly tight and expensive food situation, increasing water problems, and growing environmental stress" (*The Global 2000 Report*, 1980: 43).

Many of the prominent global modelling exercises rely on computer technology and limit the scope of inquiry to relatively small quantifiable variables. Almost no attention is paid to specific human wants or basic human needs, let alone to the psychological, cultural, and normative dimensions of the world in which we live. The Latin American World Model (Herrera, 1976), developed as a Third World response to the Club of Rome projections in *The Limits to Growth* (Meadows et al, 1972), stands out as a notable exception in this regard.

The world order approach to global modelling is not designed to manipulate quantitative data and variables or to seek a technocratic fix. Its principal aim is to highlight the value premises (beliefs) and value goals (preferences) of each scenario of the future and to assess critically the extent to which it facilitates the normative, holistic shaping of human destiny. Ours is a form of *soft modelling*, an exercise in normative forecasting with a heuristic rather than a dogmatic posture. Contrary to some critics, the basic thrust of the world order modelling is not apocalyptic or eschatological prophecy (Oakes and Stunkel, 1981), but an exploration of preferred futures that can be used as a road map for formulating transition steps and envisaging a positive

evolution of political life at all levels, from the personal and local to the collective and global. The search for preferred futures that satisfy the criteria of normative desirability and political feasibility is an ongoing dialectical process joining inquiry of the past, present, and future.

World order studies has become increasingly aware of the hazards of premature structural specificity. Like functionalists who concentrate on specific tasks of international life, most world order scholars have grown skeptical about grand schemes or legal-institutional blueprints for a brave new world envisioned. To design a specific structure at the outset is to rigidify or even hamper the value-enhancing process. The logic and implications of world order modelling, however, do call for creative attention to problems of transnational governance, the handling of issues whose scope exceeds the boundaries of any single state. A focus on governance implies thinking about new ways to supplement statist authority and competence in a variety of areas, but not necessarily with an integrated, new general authority structure.

(3) *Transition Politics.* By transition politics we mean how to build relevant and reliable bridges connecting where we are now to where we want to be in the future. Indeed, this represents the most elusive task in world order studies. Much of traditional world order thinking has been "utopian" in the sense of having been unable or unwilling to conceive of a transition process. This challenge of building transition bridges and pathways is greatly complicated by the lack of any credible (widely tested and validated) theory of system transformation (see Zinnes, 1981). The world order approach accepts transition politics as the crucial link between the present world and a more just and humane one, but it has no master key to offer. Given the contending images of preferred worlds and the uneven distribution and realization of world order values in different parts of the world, it would be misleading even to search for a master key to the transition process. Indeed, a differentiated transition strategy sensitive to the circumstances and opportunities existent in various parts of the world appears to be the best way to proceed. The targets, actors, and arenas of this transition strategy should not be too rigidly specified or given overly globalist priorities. Instead, the task of global bridge-building calls for periodic reassessment of who is doing what, where, how and with what result.

Our approach to transition politics rests upon the centrality of values. The world order approach conceptualizes transition in terms of human intervention to shape the value-realizing process. At the same time the world order values of peace, economic well-being, social justice, and ecological balance should not be placed in abeyance pending the completion of the transition process; these values apply to the means as well as to the ends of transition politics. So many social and political revolutions have betrayed their own

vision and devoured their own followers, including former leaders, because of an insensitivity to the mutually enhancing or corrupting effects of the relationship between means and ends in political behavior. Hence, our approach seeks a new conception of "revolution," one that differs from "mere seizures of power, a way of circulating elites through bloody events, after which the same 'rotten things begin all over again'" (Ajami, 1980: 483). We need to look at transition with operational definitions of values that make it possible to assess the progress or regress during a given period of world politics in any of the four world order value domains.

World order studies reflects various orientations to transition. Our approach combines both actor-oriented and structure-oriented perspectives. We believe both perspectives are necessary to understand the manner in which individuals and groups at different systemic levels and in different domains may successfully intervene in ongoing social, political, economic, and cultural processes to bring about social change. A credible politics of system transformation, however, calls for both conceptual and political inputs from those who are most victimized by the existing world order. Social change may be a luxury only a few progressive elites can afford, but it is an imperative for those who suffer from the existing order. The politics of transition depends upon the oppressed becoming conscious of their suffering and developing a political will to reshape their destiny. This consciousness-raising and mobilizing activity is a crucial element in the transition process.

III. Stages of World Order Studies. In a critical appraisal of the promise and prospects of the world order modelling movement associated with WOMP, the late Harold Lasswell (1977: 427) observed that "the agenda for coming basic revisions will be on a ten-year cycle, and the intervals will be adapted to the occurrence of major changes." This assessment has proved on target. Since academic debates on contemporary world order studies have centered largely on WOMP, it seems useful to briefly summarize how the world order approach of WOMP has actually evolved over the years. Three distinct stages can be depicted, although these shifts in conceptual focus and methodological orientation should not obscure certain common features of the approach that have persisted since its inception.

(1) *A Law Oriented, Institution-Building Pre-WOMP Approach.* In the first stage (1961–1968) a group of concerned American scholars largely devoted themselves to establishing world order as a respectable academic undertaking. The general framework of inquiry was largely law-oriented and institution-building in character. Within this framework, primary attention was given to the avoidance of collective violence through the creation of a war prevention system constituted by a core of strengthened international institutions. Despite the pronounced intention of studying war prevention in

the spirit of social science, the primary focus of inquiry was on international law and international organization. The underlying assumption was that institutional centralization would come about through the consent of leading governments, who would see that their distinct national interests were better served by greater world authority than by the dangerous chaos of the decentralized and laissez-faire management of power in the nuclear age.

In effect, then, this law-oriented and institution-building approach looked forward to the formation of some form of world government. The most comprehensive and rigorous example of this approach remains *World Peace Through World Law*, conceived and written by two lawyers, Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn (1958, 1960, 1966). Focusing upon amendments to the UN Charter, the Clark/Sohn proposals sought to transfer some functions, capabilities and resources from national governments to a rearranged set of global institutions. The influence of the Clark/Sohn proposals on the development of world order studies during this first stage is evident in *Legal and Political Problems of World Order* (Mendlovitz, 1962) and in the four-volume *Strategy of World Order* series (Falk and Mendlovitz, 1966a, 1966b, 1966c, 1966d, 1973). In the preface to the Strategy series, the editors noted: "It [*World Peace Through World Law*] is not selected as an expression of the ideological preference of the editors so much as to provide a model, specified in some detail, of what an alternative international system might be like. Such a model of one future for the international system facilitates our understanding of international society as it exists and operates at present and informs us more clearly about the kind of changes that must be made to fulfill the objectives of war prevention" (Falk and Mendlovitz, 1966a: vii).

The world order approach at this first stage embodied a number of features that now seem dubious. First, it appealed to the enlightened self-interest of the privileged to take the initiative in the transition toward a better world order. Such an approach was based on the uncritical acceptance and transference of liberal reform politics to the international scene. Second, this world order approach could be charged with wearing the mask "world order" to disguise the imperial face of *pax Americana*, however benevolent its actual motivations. Its conceptual origin, key participants, and pedagogical materials were all American. In its legal and structural design for world order, it reflected the rather unique historical experience of the United States with its largely successful transition from the relatively decentralized condition of "state" sovereignty under the Articles of Confederation to a "more perfect union" under a new federal system. Third, this approach thought of world order primarily in terms of world law in one form or another. The implicit assumption of such an exercise in constitutional or legal engineering was a kind of intellectual utopianism through which world order scholars could

escape the "messy and uncivilized" *political* struggles of forging an actual new order. Finally, this world order approach was conceptually inadequate as it defined world order largely in static terms of "order" and "war prevention." In short, the world order approach during the formative stage was conceptually inadequate and normatively provincial as it abstracted the question of system transformation in a manner unresponsive to the broader world-order agenda of the non-Western peoples of the world.

(2) *Diverse Images of "Preferred Worlds": WOMP I.* The establishment of WOMP in 1968 marks the initiation of the second stage (1968–1978) of world order studies. A sense of dissatisfaction with first stage efforts brought about a restructuring of the world order approach around the idea that a broader conception of world order inquiry called for the participation of representatives from the major cultures and ideologies of the world. In both a symbolic and substantive sense, WOMP represents a new cycle in the development of world order studies. The transnationalization of world order studies through the active participation of non-American scholars of international stature resulted in the broadening of the value base of world order inquiry. The central focus on war prevention shifted to a more balanced normative framework that gave more or less equal emphasis to economic well-being, social justice, and peace, and serious, although somewhat lesser emphasis, to ecological balance. As one Third World WOMP participant put it:

> Non-Western participants in that project assaulted and challenged its Western ethnocentrism; 'non-lawyers' enhanced and broadened its concerns and pushed it in the direction of political harmony and culture. Those concerned with socioeconomic justice drew attention to the fact that peace, unless rooted in socioeconomic justice, can be meaningless, stultifying, and perhaps repressive; the strong have always sought peace as a means of ensuring that their order would be unchallenged and undisturbed. The intrusion of concern for justice into world orderism was to profoundly change its thrust and essence. The hitherto legal emphasis of the movement was increasingly modified to be more self-consciously political (Ajami, 1980: 474).

Based on this broadened normative framework, WOMP participants associated with principal regions and/or actors of the world (Latin America, Africa, Japan, Europe, Soviet Union, India, United States, with indirect representation for China and for the network of transnational actors) embarked on book-length formulations of their approach to world order. Since the values were stated in general terms and subject to a variety of interpretations, and since participants were free to propose additional values, this framework was fully consistent with pluralism in style of inquiry and substantive vision. This transnational collaborative research enterprise cut across cultures and worldviews to develop new ways of thinking about system transformation, culminating in a series of six books under the umbrella title

"Preferred Worlds for the 1990s" (Kothari, 1974; Falk, 1975; Mendlovitz, 1975; Mazrui, 1976; Lagos and Godoy, 1977; Galtung, 1980).

Although the *Preferred Worlds* series generated considerable interest and controversy in academic circles, including those outside the West (see references debates on WOMP), its overall impact on collective ways of thinking, feeling, and acting toward a cohesive vision of a new world order has been modest. The criticisms of WOMP, some justified and some not, covered the entire spectrum of intellectual discourse, including conceptual, methodological, empirical, and political objections. Mainstream international relations research, still self-confined by the state-centric framework of inquiry, has shown the tendency of dismissing "world order" as naive, utopian, and diversionary from the mainline potential for actual global reform.

Within its own turf, WOMP has not given adequate attention to the transition problem. The *Preferred Worlds* series has not provided either a satisfactory systematic or substantive treatment of transition politics by way of prescribing behavioral guidance for world order activists. In addition, WOMP was unable to achieve sustained, prominent participation of scholars from the Soviet Union, or more generally, from the Communist world. Third World participation symbolized the transnationalization of world order inquiry without any corresponding cohesion in research purpose, modelling design, or an integrated world order vision. This resulted in a constant questioning of the premises of the undertaking. In this respect, the views of Rajni Kothari, a leading Indian scholar, are characteristic. Kothari, while evolving his own WOMP vision of the future, remains skeptical about the "world order" enterprise, suspecting that it may, in part, be a carrier of Western hegemonic thinking, a species of cultural imperialism (Kothari, 1980; Mendlovitz, 1981).

Now that the second stage of world order studies (or WOMP I) is behind us, it is easy to see why and where it failed to live up to its initial promises. First, generating a strong and cohesive political will toward normative goals of system transformation is almost impossible, given current global conditions. The transnationalization of world order inquiry with the purpose of finding collective (and hopefully united) ways of thinking, feeling, and acting strongly suggests the proverbial story of the six blind beggars who encounter an elephant. Second, world order studies has not succeeded in breaking the virtual monopoly of the realist school in defining what is real and feasible. Many influential specialists continue to reject the WOMP dual perception of danger and transformative trends, and concentrate in the name of "pragmatism" on comprehending the state system and making it work more efficiently. Third, the repeated charge of utopianism cannot be dealt with in a convincing manner unless WOMP comes up with a conception of

transition politics that undergirds its call for system change and comprehensive restructuring. These criticisms of WOMP ultimately direct attention to the question of "human nature." Any definition of feasibility and workability of transition imagery is greatly influenced by our views of human nature. One inadequacy of WOMP I was its failure to base its conceptions of the future upon a coherent image of the plasticity of human nature.

(3) *Struggle of the Oppressed: WOMP II.* The third stage of world order studies (WOMP II) began in 1978 when perspectives and orientations began to shift in the direction of emphasizing voices of the oppressed as the key basis for the realization of world order values. In part, this new emphasis acknowledges that past approaches to world order were overly preoccupied with formal institutions, especially the tension between states and international organizations, and insufficiently concerned about social movements and grassroots initiatives arising out of the popular sector. The new framework builds its hopes for the future around various forms of "world order populism," adapted to diversities of context and agenda.

This framework distinguishes between three intersecting systems of politics: the first system consisting of territorial actors, that is, the state system and its supporting infrastructure of corporations, banks, and knowledge and news industry; the second system consisting of international organizations, including the United Nations and regional international institutions; and the third system consisting of people acting individually and collectively (that is, the popular sector) through voluntary social movements and associations of all kinds. This new stage in world order thinking does not attempt to convince its audience as much as it tries to show the extent to which transitional changes are actually taking place in various sectors of the world system and how these may relate to the overall quest for a new world order. This third major reorientation of world order inquiry (WOMP II) is reflected in a number of WOMP projects, including a multivolume *Studies on a Just World Order* series (Falk, Kim, and Mendlovitz, 1982; Falk, Kratochwil, and Mendlovitz, 1982; Falk, Kim, and Mendlovitz, forthcoming).

This synoptic sketch shows that WOMP is not static or monolithic. WOMP's continuing search for collective ways and means of thinking, feeling, and acting for a just world order system is an ongoing process subject to periodic review, genuine revision, and plural paths (e.g., some participants emphasize libertarian socialism while others stress some degree of centralization). Despite these shifts in conceptual focus and methodological orientation, certain continuities give coherence to the world order approach since its inception: emphasis on system transformation; depiction of preferred world order systems; avowal of explicit values; concern about transition politics; and a holistic conception of the global human interest.

IV. WOMP and Other Globalist Outlooks. As already indicated, WOMP is one of several "post-Machiavellian" orientations that arise from an appreciation of the trends toward fragility and integration at the global level. These globalist outlooks reflect a variety of concrete circumstances, including the impulse to manage turbulent geopolitical and geoeconomic forces. The purpose of this section is to comment on these globalisms from the perspective of the world order approach.[3]

In WOMP's view, the most important attribute of a political stance is its relationship to the nexus of values and organizational capacities. Using the present stage of the state system as a baseline it becomes possible to distinguish among globalisms. As now constituted, the state system is not well adapted to the realization of world order values, and it could degenerate even further either through the intensification of "chaos" or the adoption of more regressive patterns of order.

(1) *System-Diminishing Globalism.* Overt militarism is an instance of a system-diminishing globalism. Overt militarism raises even higher the risks of general war and increases the reliance on military means to achieve security. It also involves the diversion of resources from productive roles, including the satisfaction of basic human needs. Mindless industrialism may also be system-diminishing to the extent that it exempts industrial actors from even the current low standards of environmental regulation, or panders to excessive consumerism. Any large-scale "waste" of resources constitutes maldevelopment and is system-diminishing in our view.

In general, system-diminishing attitudes include abandoning concern about human rights, renouncing efforts to complete negotiations on a new law of the seas, eroding support for the United Nations, diminishing support for programs designed to help poorer Third World countries, and avoiding procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes. System-diminishing globalism is essentially imperial in conception. It premises prospects for order upon global unification through the domination of a single center of state power or through some kind of allocation of imperial authority arising out of unresolved rivalries. The basis for this globalism is military power forged into tight alliance systems. The ideology of President Ronald Reagan's administration moves in these general directions. This type of globalism is most appropriately formulated in the militarist spirit of ideological cohesion and grand strategy (see Cline, 1980).

(2) *System-Maintaining Globalism.* In a period of rapid change and disruption, some policy-oriented intellectuals believe a globalist orientation is needed to stabilize the present statist framework, and to prevent a further breakdown of existing patterns of power and authority. System-maintaining globalism, then, is essentially a defensive posture, but one that is alert to the

need for self-restraining behavior as well as for transnational coordination. It is preoccupied with economic relations bearing on trade, investment, money, and believes that military power is not a viable instrument of policy under modern conditions. At the same time, it contains neither normative energy for reform nor pragmatic demands that international stability requires major structural reforms.

The Trilateral Commission, especially in its initial phase (1973–76) illustrates this type of anti-visionary globalism (Sklar, 1980). More recently, because of the prevalence of system-diminishing globalism, the Trilateral Commission has muted its earlier conception about how to manage turmoil and has succumbed, at least for the present, to system-diminishing pressures.

(3) *System-Reforming Globalism*. The energy for system-reform really stems from the non-Western world, and is expressed in the demands of the Non-Aligned Movement, UNCTAD, and the Group of 77 for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). To the extent that OPEC joined these forces in the mid 1970s, system-reforming globalism possessed significant leverage. Indeed, the formation of the Trilateral Commission can be partly understood as an effort to forge a neutralizing response for system-maintenance. More recently, however, OPEC has joined forces with the system-maintainers by delinking oil pricing policy from wider policy issues, while the system-maintainers have relapsed in system-diminishing directions by emphasizing the military side of security. Post-Mao China, too, became part of the problem by shifting from the "system-transforming" to a system-maintaining approach to world order (see Kim, 1981c). As a consequence, the quest for the NIEO in all of its various forms bearing on access to capital, markets, resources, and technology has virtually lapsed, representing now nothing more than tired rhetoric.

At no point has this system-reforming globalism sought to transform the underlying framework of international society. The rhetoric in Third World arenas often resembles the WOMP call for a new world order, but their actual concerns have focused on economic well-being and even here, only on the *international* circumstances (virtually exempting from scrutiny flawed domestic modes of implementation, however regressive). Furthermore, the satisfaction of the system-reformers' demands would not have any organizational implications for world order. In fact, the most vocal voices were unconditionally statist, limiting concerns to an anti-interventionist ethos designed to protect the hard-won political independence of Third World countries. Such Third World statism has distrusted any intrusion in internal affairs whatever the pretext, although it has been generally receptive to certain supranational forms of international cooperation (e.g., "common heritage" management of ocean mineral resources), if the main effect was to

give the Third World governments a better relative position in the international economic order.

Even in matters of nuclear weapons the system-reform constituency has been relatively passive, possibly because the stronger or more embattled states do not want to foreclose altogether their own options. There has been some criticism of the two-tier structure of nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states and particularly of the nuclear weapons countries for their failure to persist with arms control and disarmament negotiations as pledged in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. On balance, one can conclude that the Third World is not prepared to push hard for reform when it comes to the character of international security. This reluctance, possibly, is a reflection of perceived impotence, but it may also be a failure to take seriously the risks and global magnitude of present trends, reflecting a pre-globalist form of political consciousness.

(4) *System-Transforming Globalism.* In contrast to the global positions set forth above, system-transforming globalism seeks a comprehensive restructuring of the frameworks that shape our political, economic, and cultural lives. In Section I the general WOMP position was presented and will not be repeated here. Some similar system-transforming approaches exist, including various forms of philosophical anarchism, which emphasize the dismantling of the state without necessarily building up, as an alternative, international regimes and institutions. With its stress on minimum bureaucratization consistent with world order values, the WOMP outlook shares to some degree this emphasis on dismantling.

A globalism is system-transforming, in our view, if it has a normative agenda that can only be realized by comprehensive restructuring (including destructuring) and a political program for imposing its vision on the historical process. Anti-statism is the litmus test of a system-transforming approach, but with the qualifications made earlier that statist forms may be selectively required at this stage to neutralize the effects of unequal state power and hierarchy. Furthermore, anti-statism does not imply doing away with the state as an organizing center for national political life, but only the need to overcome the operating logic of violence and war as the foundation of relations among states. A system-transforming globalism also anticipates higher levels of productivity and resource-sharing to enable the satisfaction of the basic human needs of all peoples, as well as generalized procedures for the defense of human rights and the protection of the environment. Such a reorientation of politics presupposes the diffusion of globalist belief and myth systems to support community sentiments at the global level. In effect, this series of developments would manifest what it means to think, feel, and act like a global citizen in a world where global citizenship established the

political climate to an extent comparable to the way national citizenship currently dominates the political climate. We cannot be sure, especially in the countries of the First and Second Worlds, how far such globalist attitudes have spread. There may be evolving a strong undercurrent of globalist sentiment throughout the world, which will remain hidden until activated by cataclysmic events or charismatic leaders alert to the needs of the time.

(5) *World Systems.* The work of Immanuel Wallerstein is one example of a non-WOMP system-transforming globalism. His historical investigations of world capitalism fuse with his anticipation of its demise and replacement by a socialist world government sometime deep in the 21st century (Wallerstein, 1979). In a neo-Marxist vein, Wallerstein interprets political patterns as derivative from economic realities, essentially, the interaction between the division of labor and control over advanced production modes.

Wallerstein extends the idea of class to the relations among states. He depicts the world system as divided among core, periphery, and semi-periphery states. Core states are at the cutting edge of high technology, the centers of advanced modes of production. Semi-peripheral states engage in intermediate levels of production, but also supply raw materials to the core and provide markets for core-country surplus production. Peripheral states have only a tiny modern sector, and exist mainly in a relationship of economic dependency to the core.

In the formulations of Wallerstein, Samir Amin and others, the global transformation in process will evolve out of the dynamics of national revolution in the periphery and semi-periphery. These dynamics will strengthen the global position of socialist values and structures. Wallerstein has not yet specified a transition path, but it would seem to involve the disintegration of world capitalism brought about by accelerating contradictions, on the one hand, and a coalition of the world's antisystemic forces (or what he calls "real worldwide intermovement links") on the other (Wallerstein, 1980).

This world system orientation is based on an interpretation of extant social forces, especially as they bear on economic organization. The world order outcome is not a matter of the observer's will, but a consequence of inherent tensions and shifting relations of forces. There may be little disparity in actual content between WOMP's recent stress on the struggles of the oppressed and the Wallerstein/Amin world system constructions.[4] WOMP relates "oppression" to a broader category of reality than does the world system approach which focuses mainly on the adverse effects of the international division of labor. WOMP, for example, places greater emphasis on what it means to be treated as "a nuclear guinea pig" or as ecologically expendable. WOMP also clarifies the preferred future by postulating values rather than by conceiving of the oppressed as automatic bearers of the

normative content of the new politics. Finally, WOMP has been more concerned than the world systems analysts with mapping "central guidance" alternatives to either world government or statism. The world systems approach is essentially a depiction of the rise and fall of capitalism as a world force in the aftermath of the breakdown of feudalism, whereas WOMP is more of a policy exercise in discerning challenges and devising responses given the operative global setting of state sovereignty and national development. Nevertheless, these two outlooks are largely complementary and compatible. Various conceptual and normative bridges can be built to enrich both outlooks, thereby moving closer to a general conception of system-transforming globalism.

(6) *Traditional Utopography*. The projection of a utopia, an alternative framework for human existence, has long fascinated men and women. The original notion of utopia was mainly connected with the ideal city, a wordly complement to the pastoral ideal of Eden. More recently, however, the utopian quest has involved conceiving of the entire world as a potential ideal city. The functions of utopography are to hold up a mirror to the deficiencies of the existing order and to suggest what life could or should be like if human potential or aspiration were to be fully realized. In the nuclear age, the idea of utopia has become mingled with arguments about human evolution and the new requirements for survival. The utopian tradition is imaginative rather than empirical; it posits a vision rather than demonstrates that the present will yield a particular future or that a given alternative vision is feasible. Hence, it has been the imagination of creative writers and philosophers rather than the exploration of social scientists that has produced the most provocative examples of utopography. Indeed, in the West, the ascendancy of analytic methods in philosophic inquiry has virtually eliminated professional philosophers from the domain of utopia and has left the field to novelists and science fiction writers.

Doris Lessing and Ursula LeGuin have made outstanding contributions to the contemporary corpus of utopian literature. Doris Lessing has investigated various dimensions of the future, especially the prospects for carrying on after the disintegration of civilization or the apocalyptic breakdown resulting from nuclear war. Her imaginings of the future, however, do not extend to constructing a governing framework. LeGuin in *The Dispossessed* does offer us an investigation of an alternative world, "an ambiguous utopia," that is organized around a non-materialist, austere anarchism. She establishes an existential context of choice between worlds, the materialist world we know that is elitist and violence-prone, yet rich in materialist opportunity for the successful minority, and the anarchist possibility that is posited as dreary in terms of life style, yet preferable in the end. LeGuin's interpretation of the

human prospect is not overly optimistic (that is, "utopian" in the traditional sense), yet it does perceive a way out of the current bind, which she, along with Lessing and many others, consider a nuclear dead end.

This kind of imaginative sweep definitely implies a system-transforming globalism. The perspectives and concerns of such authors are definitely post-statist. In fact, the state is seen as a political antique with lethal propensities. Being a citizen of the world—or more generally, a member of the human species—is taken for granted as a necessary attribute of a healthy world. At the same time, such outlooks are not escapist. Both Lessing and LeGuin manifest a deep awareness of the existing context and a determination to transcend its limitations in a humanly fulfilling way. Of course, such writers are not interested in data as it is usually understood, but only in basic structures, force fields, attitudes, and behavior.

As with world systems, the best instances of contemporary utopography are integral to the world order approach. They provide a rich source of insight that helps orient the analysis in a diagnostic sense and that gives flesh and bones to a positive image of a transformed world. To be utopian is not necessarily to be unrealistic; on the contrary, it is to portray as realistically as possible what could or may come into being. As such, utopian writing provides a context for system-transforming forms of social scientific investigation and presentation. Additional work is needed to discover and study non-Western imaginative reconstructions of possible future worlds.

(7) *Mainstream International Relations Research.* Even a system-transforming globalism can benefit from system-maintaining and system-reforming investigations. Careful depictions of the resilience of the state system, such as those by Hedley Bull, Robert Gilpin or Stanley Hoffmann, contribute to our understanding of the way in which the evolving system is operating. To the extent a system-transforming approach emphasizes transition from here to there, it becomes essential to possess a sophisticated awareness of the dynamics of the existing order. Furthermore, from a purely normative point of view, the stabilizing and moderating properties of the state system may improve the prospects for avoiding traumatic transitions or breakdowns. To the extent that system-transforming globalisms seek to embody their values in the transition process it may be important to acknowledge the contributions of the system-maintaining approach to "minimum order."

System reformers tend to regard the challenge of global developments as structural to some degree and analyze these developments as diluting the purity of statist logic. The work of Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, and Ernst Haas is suggestive. These authors see a functionalist dynamic of challenge and response in the realities of "complex interdependence" with new roles for international regimes, institutions, and procedures. The 1980s Project of

the Council on Foreign Relations explored system reform largely with such an orientation.

As we suggested above, the main energy for system reform comes from the Third World. The Third World's grievances with existing arrangements is one dimension of the struggle of the oppressed. Indeed, Third World pressures for economic reform, although deferential to the statist framework, embody world order values to a considerable extent. The frustration of these reformist goals, as well as the upsurge of militarization at all levels of political life, may soon disclose systemic obstacles to the pursuit of national or Third World goals. In this respect, a small reorientation of political consciousness on the part of system-reformers could lead to a shift in outlook resembling that of system-transformers.

A distinction can be made among various scholarly approaches on the basis of their normative premises. To the extent that the primary concern of inquiry is stability and order within current frameworks then there is a natural antagonism between mainstream international relations research and WOMP. If the motivation, however, is guided by normative goals involving the pursuit of world order values, then the inquiries are compatible even if the diagnoses and strategies are divergent.

V. Research Paths: The Cutting Edge of World Order Inquiry. The cutting edge of world order studies at any given moment refers to the challenge of restructuring the general framework of inquiry so as to enhance its relevance for disciplined inquiry into the global problematique and to establish a closer dialogue between the empirical reality of the present world order system and the preferred reality of alternative world order systems. Five broad areas of inquiry have currently emerged as the cutting edge of world order studies.

(1) *A Struggle Theory of Social Change.* A classic and influential struggle theory of social change was embodied in the Communist Manifesto of 1848 which called upon the exploited of all countries to rise and rebel, for they "have nothing to lose but their chains." Can we reformulate and reapply this struggle theory in terms relevant to the present world system and compatible with world order values? In the final analysis, system transformation is not so much a function of ivory-tower intellectual exercises as it is of political struggles waged by oppressed peoples. The possibilities of system transformation depend on the extent to which the political consciousness of the oppressed is raised to the threshold of action and on the extent to which political struggles everywhere become oriented around the pursuit of world order values.

In this connection, the Marxist struggle theory is too restrictive as it focuses too exclusively on just one structural dimension of human oppression. The

present world order system is oppressive in several respects. Adverse normative trends in recent years have accentuated the contradictions in the world system. Some forms of oppression remain "invisible," that is, not perceived as avoidable oppression by victims. Invisible oppression is largely a function of present world order deficiencies, especially those relating to the continuous threat to our lives, society and civilization, and even to our species, posed by catastrophic nuclear war. The enormity of the peril and our seeming helplessness leads us to block out or numb our awareness of the danger. Other causes of failure or refusal to see the various forms of invisible oppression are too numerous to elaborate here (see Falk, 1982). A struggle theory of social change for world order studies must be able to identify present oppressive structures and show their interconnections and global implications. Such demonstrations could influence political consciousness and eventually help mobilize millions of people for the work of devising transition tactics and strategies to achieve more humane alternative futures.

(2) *International Regimes and World Order.* Although international regimes have proliferated and various regime theories have been advanced in recent years, the conceptual and normative relationships between the international political economy and world order approaches to global problems remain largely unexplored. This has brought about the criticism that "world order and future studies were fundamentally flawed in terms of both theory and action." According to this view, scholars struggling to understand the basic dynamics of global politics should provide "both a description of central structures and processes at work in global politics and an explanation of why and how these structures and processes work the way they do" (Targ, 1979: 371, 381). In response to this criticism, world order inquiry into international regimes attempts to establish a linkage between the two by placing regime research in a world order framework and by formulating and exploring a number of normative questions (Kim, 1981b; Falk, Kim, and Mendlovitz, forthcoming).

Specifically, this approach examines the global politics of "complex interdependence" by applying the "who," "what," and "how" of Lasswell's famous definition of politics. The globalization of international relations has rendered the question of "who governs in the world system" too inconclusive and unwieldly. A more appropriate focus is "whose hands guide or govern international regimes in different issue areas?" International regimes may provide a specific setting and focus for reconceptualizing the dialectic between the conservative forces defending the existing order and the emerging reformist or revolutionary forces struggling to create a new world, especially when it is related to system-wide conflicts and contradictions. What (and whose) norms and interests contend in what ways in regime politics? What

deeper social, political, and economic realities are embodied in and reflected by international regimes? To what extent is there a shared notion or several competing notions of world order that is beginning to be evident across the whole range of global institutions? What is the international regime/international organization nexus? What type and range of structural images of the future can we draw from regime politics? These are among the key questions that will be emphasized by the world order approach to the study of international regimes.

Our preliminary analysis suggests that the regime approach to world order studies has advantages and disadvantages. By focusing on the formal and informal norms and the visible and invisible structures of power that converge upon the governing process pertaining to a specific global issue, this approach promises to give us a more "realistic" picture of world politics. The traditional approaches to international organizations suffered from their exaggerated assumption about the potency of formalized rules and visible structures of power. The disadvantages of this approach lie in the conceptual elusiveness of "international regime," and in the tendency to take a fragmented and overspecialized approach that not only reproduces the technological division of labor and specialization inherent in the management of complex interdependence but also embodies the normative bias in favor of scientific/technocratic fixes.

In substantive terms, the world order approach to international regimes illustrates the "normative power" of the global underdogs and the "material power" of the global topdogs. Dominant world actors exert powerful pressure to assess regime performance by reference to technical issues rather than in terms of values and structural transformation. As seen in NIEO politics, these dominant actors may at times acquiesce in the normative claims of the Third World at a rhetorical level provided such new norms are not embodied to any significant degree in reforms of the power structure. Regime politics also show the extent to which statism, hegemony, scientific/technocratic determinism, and a fragmented paradigm color and shape the perception of social reality in contemporary global politics. Our contention is that to tap fully the potential embedded in regime research, it is necessary to adopt a critical stance toward the prevalent "scientific/technocratic" style of inquiry. The world order approach to international regimes would place its emphasis on more holistic issues.

(3) *Comparative Foreign Policy and World Order*. State actors are the principal participants in the current world order system. The case for the state's predominance is based on its competence to uphold national interests (especially territorial integrity and political independence) and its embodiment of statist values. Some of these values are procedural, and are asso-

ciated with the consent of the governed, representatives of the working people or their vanguard party, or the like. The international performance of state actors, however, has been rarely monitored in a systematic way. Some proposals to this effect can be found (e.g., Snyder, Hermann, and Lasswell, 1976), but the first full-scale study of governmental performance in the global arena was undertaken by Robert Johansen in relation to United States foreign policy (Johansen, 1980). Johansen examined the gaps between the stated objectives and actual implementation of U.S. foreign policy with respect to world order values. His evaluation was based on four "cases" (SALT, foreign aid to India, human rights for Chile in the Allende period, support for international control of marine pollution), each illustrative of a world order value. Johansen's study can be read at one level as a critique of American hypocrisy and moralism, and at another, as to what shifts would need to occur if the United States were to align its foreign policy with world order values. In the background, of course, is the unresolved structural question of whether a leading state actor can genuinely pursue world order values in the present world system.

On the basis of Johansen's pioneering inquiry, an effort to extend the approach on a comparative basis has been made by appraising the foreign policy of various countries from a world order perspective (Falk, 1981). A world order appraisal of foreign policy helps establish how the wide array of states handle their participation in the world system.

The structural dimension of comparative foreign policy analysis cannot be overlooked. To what extent does the evolving structure of the world system constrain leadership at the state level? To what extent can imaginative state leadership harmonize foreign policy goals with the promotion of the human interest and the realization of world order values? What attributes of statehood (e.g., scale, resource endowment, type of polity, etc.) condition relative world order performance? Is the evolving character of the state system becoming more or less conducive to positive world order performance for various states? and why?

(4) *Alternative Security Frameworks and Demilitarization.* A central preoccupation of the world order approach since its inception has been the phenomenon of war. The main early response was to advocate disarmament and international peacekeeping mechanisms, and to encourage an international and collective security system in place of national and unilateral security systems. Such an approach has increasingly come to appear unrealistic given the logic of state action and the hierarchical nature of the state system.

WOMP thus has tried to reinterpret the challenge of war in more politically relevant terms. In recent years, its emphasis has turned to the interlinked pat-

terns of militarization that arise from the horizontal rivalries of the leading states, the vertical relations of powerful and weaker sectors of the world system and of various regional systems, and the domestic dominance patterns by which elites maintain control over the apparatus of government and the sources of wealth, prestige, and knowledge. The world order interpretation of militarization insists that a counter-movement must take account of each of these three dimensions. The early results of this new transnational study are reported in two recent issues of *Alternatives* (Falk and Sakamoto, 1980a; Falk and Sakamoto, 1980b).

The WOMP study acknowledges that the prospects for demilitarization are not bright in the near future. In fact, principal trends point to the intensification of militarization in all three areas during the years ahead. There are, however, some countertrends, including a growing anxiety at the grassroots level about the wisdom and legitimacy of nuclear-based security systems. The world order approach emphasizes the identification of normative initiatives that are able to delegitimize all three types of militarization. A global campaign for the prohibition of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction may deserve a high priority at this time. Scholarly research and political activity would be mutually reinforcing in this context.

On a longer time-frame, but also central to the WOMP endeavor, is the reorientation of security. We draw a contrast between *rulers security* whereby elites employ military and paramilitary means to secure narrowly based hierarchical relationships and structures of privilege and *peoples security* whereby the protection of general interests in autonomy and development are upheld in the least destructive manner. The character of peoples security remains to be explored in a variety of contexts. Techniques of unarmed resistance, nonviolence, and neutralism seem increasingly attractive in an age of guided missiles, rapidly deployable interventionary forces, and government units trained and equipped to administer torture as a routine matter.

(5) *Global Cultural Nexus.* The world order approach with its emphasis on values and human interests has recently begun to examine the relevance of cultural factors. Such an inquiry is a departure from the initial stress on law and institutions as the building blocks of a new world order and the subsequent emphasis on economic development and national revolution. These earlier concerns have not been superceded, but deepened to include the civilizational dimensions of politics and economics. The Iranian Revolution, despite its troubled path since 1978, has disclosed the potency of non-materialistic concerns. In fact, the leaders of this revolution have consistently subordinated materialist considerations, confusing those who assume such priorities. However perverse and misguided, the Iranian Revolution is, at its

crux, a defense of Iranian cultural (including religious) integrity, no matter what the costs (in conventional ethical terms).

Locked in the history of the world's peoples are many sacred images and stories. This cultural data shapes the path of legitimate development for all societies and is organically connected with any eventual hope for demilitarization. These are elusive, controversial matters. WOMP has formed a transnational group of scholars that seeks to bring these issues more clearly into the various dialogues about the future of world order. One early priority of this work has been to demystify the claims of Western Civilization to supplant other cultural traditions in the interests of progress and rational development. The Western role has provided authoritative rationalizations of power relations, not a rational model necessarily worthy of non-Western emulation. In fact, even within the West, there are signs that the high technology path is leading to disaster, causing acute stress in the most affluent countries even apart from the rapid buildup of geopolitical, ecological, and economic pressures that are apparently driving the world system toward catastrophic breakdown.

The search here is for a more adequate stance toward the future that draws on the richest traditions of the past, including the philosophic basis for globalist identity that lies buried in every major world cultural tradition (Walker, 1980, 1981). In a sense, the world order approach at this stage is seeking to clarify the various cultural traditions that influence the outlook and behavior of actors in international life. A more ambitious undertaking is to discern whether there is enough cultural common ground upon which to construct a cosmopolitan sequel to statism that encourages the identification with the human species as a whole without foregoing the distinctive symbols and backgrounds of each particular experience of human groups through time.

Conclusion. World order studies has two ambitions: to establish an enduring academic presence and to provide a basis for a movement for social change that encompasses issues of global scale. Only time will tell whether its reading of contemporary history as disaster-prone and as favorable to the struggles of oppressed peoples is correct, and whether if correct, these struggles can be carried to completion without provoking catastrophe. As it is, the world order approach provides an alternative to both Machiavellianism and Marxism for students concerned about the shape of things to come in international life.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Some of the confusions about the position of WOMP on these issues stems from the fact that Saul Mendlovitz, the founder and leader of WOMP since its inception, has declared his personal conviction that world government is an inevitable sequel to the state system within a relatively few decades (e.g., Mendlovitz, 1975: xvi). Furthermore, if contemplating a post-statist world political system, then some imagery of the mix between centralization and decentralization of authority (structures and functions) is unavoidable, although the implication of such discussion is not necessarily at all a net increase in bureaucratization or centralization. Most WOMP authors stress the desirability and possibility of debureaucratization and decentralization in the context of increased value sharing and global identity (e.g., Falk, 1975; Galtung, 1980; Lagos, 1977; Mazrui, 1976).

[2]The conflict between national autonomy (e.g., Kurds, Palestinians) and state autonomy (e.g., Iran, Israel) is one of the great ongoing dimensions of global conflict.

[3]This section relies upon, yet alters, the framework of Falk (1977: 181–189).

[4]The world system orientation is reviewed from the perspective of international relations research and theory in Hollist and Rosenau (1981), a special issue of *International Studies Quarterly*.

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